DISCRIMINATION-TITLE VII-LAYOFFS

OF WOMEN AND MEM-

BERS OF MINORITY GROUPS PURSUANT TO A PLANT-WIDE SENIORITY SYSTEM CONTAINED IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT HELD NOT TO VIOLATE TITLE VII-Jersey Central Power &
Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).

In January of 1972, a charge was filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that Jersey
Central Power & Light Company,' and seven local affiliates of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 2 were maintaining certain employment practices which effectively discriminated
against women and minority groups in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 After investigating the complaint, the
EEOC found a reasonable basis for concluding that the company
had discriminated in its hiring and promotion policies. As a result,
in December of 1973, a conciliation agreement was negotiated
between the company,-the EEOC, and the unions.4 According to
the pertinent provisions of that agreement, the company stipulated
that it would refrain from discriminating against women and
minority groups with respect to their hiring and advancement, 5
and further pledged that an "affirmative action program" would be
established to increase the percentages of those workers on the
company's payroll over a five year period. 6
In July of 1974, the company announced that due to adverse
economic circumstances it would be necessary to lay off a substantial number of employees. After being informed of the plan, the

I

Jersey Central is a large public utility located in New Jersey and involved in the
generation and distribution of electric power to forty-three percent of the state. Brief for
Appellee at 4, Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
' The unions involved were Locals 327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309 and 1314, with
whom Jersey Central had collective bargaining agreements. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.
v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 692 n.2 (3d Cir. 1975).
3 Id. at 694. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 etseq. (1970),
broadly "prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL FOR TITLE

VII LITIGATION 4 (rev. 1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as TITLE VII MANUAL].
The Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), conferring upon
that office the authority to investigate charges of discrimination and to arbitrate conciliation
agreements. Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 granted the
EEOC the authority to bring actions on behalf of individuals against employers suspected of
discrimination. Id. at 1-2.
" Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 694 (3d Cir. 1975).
5 Id.

6 Id. at 695.
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unions responded by insisting that workers be laid off in accordance with the plant-wide seniority system which was set forth in
the collective bargaining agreement.7 In response, the EEOC maintained that a layoff procedure based solely upon plant-wide seniority would have a disproportionate impact upon the recently hired
women and members of minority groups, in violation of both the
conciliation agreement, and Title VII.' To resolve the apparent
conflict between the conciliation agreement and the collective bargaining contract, the company instituted an action for a declaratory
judgment 0 in order to determine which of the two covenants was
to govern its actions in the laying off of employees."1
The district court stated in an oral opinion that, to the extent
that the two contracts were inconsistent, the conciliation agreement
was to prevail. The court emphasized that to lay off employees
according to the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
contract would have a disproportionate effect on women and
7 Id. at 696. According to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, workers
would be laid off in reverse order of seniority. Pursuant to that agreement, " '[sleniority is
defined as length of continuous service with the Company.'" Id.
In addition to plant-wide seniority (sometimes referred to as "mill" seniority), other
types of seniority systems presently utilized are: departmental seniority (measuring seniority
by length of service in a particular department); progression line seniority (measuring
seniority by length of service in a line of progression, where jobs within each line serve as
training for the next); and job seniority (measuring seniority by length of service in a
particular job). Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (1969). See
also S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 161 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLICHTER].
I Brief for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Appellee
at 3(6, Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
9 Id. at 36.
"0Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir.
1975).
The defendants in the action were the seven local affiliates of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the EEOC, the United States Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC), the United States General Services Administration (GSA),
and the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights, Department of Law and Public Safety. Brief for
Appellee, supra note 1, at 2.
On August 23, 1974, Jersey Central moved for an order to show cause why a summary
judgment should not be granted, declaring the rights and duties of the company according
to the two agreements negotiated among the company, the unions and the EEOC. On
September 5, 1974, defendants GSA and OFCC moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
in the federal district court. The EEOC opposed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, claiming that material facts were in dispute. 508 F.2d at 692. The New Jersey Division
of Civil Rights did not file a response to the complaint and failed to take part in any stage of
the proceedings. Id. at 692 n.4.
" Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.
.1975).
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minority groups, "in frustration of" the objectives of the conciliation agreement.t 2 Therefore, a partial declaratory judgment was entered' 3 in which the company was ordered to lay off employees in
a manner that would avoid a reduction of the percentage of
women and members of minority groups in the work force, rather
than in strict accordance with the procedure that was outlined in
14
the collective bargaining contract.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 1 5 reversed the
district court, holding that the two contracts did not conflict 6 and
that the procedure for layoffs should be governed by the seniority
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.' 7 The court rejected the EEOC's argument that "an implicit inconsistency exist[ed] between the two" covenants' 8 which necessitated a modifica12Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co'. v. Local 327, IBEW, Civil No. 74-1083, at 9 (D.N.J.,
Sept. 5, 1974).
13 Id.

14 Specifically, the district court ordered that the layoff procedure should not reduce
the minority group and female worker ratios below those percentages existing on July 27,
1974, one month before the layoff procedure began. Id. at 12-13.
Additionally, the district court's order required that at the end of five years, women and
minority group workers should constitute a ratio of the company's work force approximately
equal to the percentages of those groups in the relevant labor market. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1975).
15 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975). The court was satisfied thai jurisdiction had been
established on two grounds. First, the complaint had properly invoked jurisdiction on the
basis of section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970), since the company sought a declaration of its rights under the collective bargaining
agreement. 508 F.2d at 698-99. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). The court noted that the district court had incorrectly applied New
Jersey law in construing the contract. Even in state courts, such actions are governed by
federal substantive law. 508 F.2d at 699 n.32. See Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers
v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247, 250 (1964). Jurisdiction over the collective bargaining agreement based on section 301 also provided the court with ancillary jurisdiction over
the EEOC conciliation agreement. 508 F.2d at 699.
Alternatively, the court found that jurisdiction over both the collective bargaining
agreement and the conciliation agreement was properly predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970). 508 F.2d at 699. That section gives district courtsjurisdiction in actions "aris[ing] under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," where the amount in
controversy exceeds $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Although no figure was specified,
the court was satisfied that information contained in the company's complaint and affidavit
established liability in an amount that exceeded $10,000. 508 F.2d at 699 n.33.
16 508 F.2d at 704.

I Id. at 691.
18 Id.
at 702-03.
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tion of the collective bargaining contract.1" The EEOC had maintained that since the objective of the conciliation agreement was to
increase the company's percentages of female and minority workers, enforcement of the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining contract could only have the effect of thwarting that purpose.2 °
The court, however, stressed that the EEOC had only partially
articulated the goals of the conciliation agreement. 2' According to
the court's evaluation, "the true objective" of that agreement was
the hiring of females and minorities, 2 2 and that once hired,
employees in those groups should be controlled by the provisions
of the collective bargaining contract. 23 Moreover, it was asserted
that in order for a contract to be modified by a subsequent agreement, "the terms of the second contract must be so inconsistent
24
with those of the first that both contracts cannot stand together.
Emphasizing that the conciliation agreement contained no provision pertaining to seniority or layoffs and that the only objective of
the agreement was the hiring of a greater percentage of women
and minority groups,

25

the court found that the terms of the

conciliation agreement in fact incorporated the seniority provisions
of the collective bargaining contract. 26 Therefore, the court concluded that the terms of the conciliation agreement could not be
interpreted as explicitly or implicitly affecting the seniority provi27
sions of the collective bargaining contract.
19 Id. at 702.

Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 703.
22 Id. The court noted that section 111, paragraph 9, of the conciliation agreement
20

21

provided:
"Respondent Company shall make a reasonable effort to recruit minorities and females into
those craft areas where such jobs are to be filled by new hires, where they have heretofore
been underutilized or not employed."
Id. at 701 (emphasis by the court).
23 Id. at 702. The court noted that section III, paragraph 10, of the conciliation
agreement supported its evaluation of the agreement. That section provides:
"The wages, benefits, other conditions of employment and seniority date of such employee
shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement."
Id. (emphasis by the court).
Furthermore, the court noted that during negotiation of the conciliation agreement, the
EEOC had attempted to modify the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining contract
so that minority groups and women hired under the agreement would be given greater
seniority. However, the unions rejected all such suggestions of modification. Id. at 695-96
n.20.
24 Id. at 703 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 701.
26 Id. at 702.
21 Id. at 704.
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Furthermore, in the court's opinion, considerations of public
policy did not require modification of the collective bargaining contract 28 since it had been the intent of Congress to protect facially
neutral plant-wide seniority systems, even though they might operate to the disadvantage of women and minority groups. 29 Additionally, it was determined that the only evidence which could be
presented in challenging a facially neutral plant-wide seniority systo ascertaining an intent or design
tem would be "evidence directed
30
discrimination.
to disguise
The determination of whether a particular seniority system is
violative of the Act depends upon statutory interpretation. As a
result, the focus of judicial inquiry has been upon "the legislative
intent underlying Title VII. ' '3 ' Prior to the passage of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives expressed concern that sections of Title VII could
jeopardize firmly established seniority systems.3 2 Consequently, an
amendment to the Act was passed "to protect the 'bona fide seniority' " plans which were "not the result of an 'intention to discriminate.'
28
29
30

33

id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id. (footnote omitted).

"' Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative
Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102 (1974).
12 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1608-09; Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1159 (1971).
The portion of Title VII which caused the concern among some legislators was section
703(a). Id. Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual... because of...
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive ... any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
Section 703(c) provides similar prohibitions with respect to unions, making it unlawful
for a labor union
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership . . . in any way which would
deprive . . . any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin: or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
33 Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1159 (footnote omitted) (quoting from 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970)).
The amendment provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
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Subsequent interpretation of this amendment, section 703(h),
has been the subject of much litigation 34 and commentary. 35 According to some authorities, it was the intent of Congress to protect
facially neutral seniority systems regardless of whether the system
had the effect of perpetuating prior discriminatory employment
practices. 3 6 Other commentators have maintained that the legislature's approval of seniority systems was not so broad, 37 and that it
was not Congress' intent to protect those seniority systems that
were facially neutral and had a disproportionate impact upon
38
women and members of minority groups.
Part of the difficulty in evaluating the legislative intent underlying Title VII arises from the fact that supporters of the bill were
able to bring it to the floor of the Senate without prior consideration by any committee. As a result, no Senate committee report, an
important reference for interpreting the legislative history of a
federal statute, was ever published. 3 9 Consequently, most courts
have relied on the series of statements introduced by Senator Clark
in the House of Representatives as the primary source for evaluating the legislative intent underlying the Act. 40 These statements,
termed "interpretative memorand[a], '4 t supported the position
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
34 For a compilation of cases involving the validity of seniority systems within the
meaning of section 703(h) of Title VII see BNA EMP. PRACTICES MAN. 421:551, 554-60

(1975).
" See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1610-14; Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431,448-49 (1966); Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1159-60;
Note, supra note 31, at 104 n.31.
31 Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1159. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 100
n.17.
3' Developments in theLaw, supra note 32, at 1160. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7,
at 1611-14.
38 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1614.
31 See id.at 1609.
40 See, e.g., 508 F.2d at 707-08; Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,

502 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1974); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980, 987 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 515-16 (E.D. Va. 1968). Contra, Watkins v. United Steel
Workers of America, Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. La. 1974).
4' Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1609.
The statements were an interpretive memorandum compiled by the Department of
Justice, an interpretive memorandum formulated by Senators Clark of Pennsylvania and
Case of New Jersey, and a series of answers prepared by Senator Clark in response to
questions that had been presented by Senator Dirksen of Illinois. Id. at 1609-10.
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that Title VII was not intended to effect major revisions in estab42
lished plant-wide seniority systems.
However, these memoranda were silent as to departmental
seniority systems,

43

and the early cases presented courts with the

problem of evaluating the validity of such systems in light of Title
VII. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.44 was the first case to find that a
seniority system, which measured a black employee's promotion
rights according to his departmental seniority, was not a bona fide
seniority system within the meaning of Title VII. 45 Prior to 1965,

the company had organized its employees into all-black and allwhite departments.4 6 After passage of the Act, black employees
were permitted to transfer to the previously all-white departments. 47 However, because the higher paying jobs were filled on
the basis of seniority within each department, 48 black workers were
unable to acquire sufficient seniority to qualify for the higher
49
paying jobs.
Finding that the differences in the conditions of employment
for blacks and whites were the result of the company's previous
discriminatory policy of excluding blacks from certain departments, the court held that the departmental seniority system was
not "bona fide" within the meaning of the Act. 5 0 The court
explained that "[t]he act does not condone present differences that are
the result of intention to discriminate before the effective date of the
' 1
act,"
and further held that "a departmental seniority system that has

5 2
its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bonafide seniority system.
53
The situation in Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States
was similar to that evaluated in Quarles.5 4 Finding that the
42 Id. at 1609. The statements were introduced in the House by Senator Clark for the
purpose of rebutting the contrary interpretation of Title VII as expressed by Senator Hill of
Alabama. Id.
11 A departmental seniority system measures seniority by length of service in a particular department. See note 7 supra.
",279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
'" Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1617-18.
46 279 F. Supp. at 508.
4 Id. at 512.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 513.
5' Id. at 517-18 (emphasis in original).
11 Id.at 518.
52 Id. at 517 (emphasis in original).
53 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
14 In United Papermakers, prior to 1964, the company had organized jobs through the
use of progression lines within each department. Under this procedure, jobs within each line
served as training for the next line. Promotion within each line was determined by job
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employer maintained a departmental seniority system which had
the effect of perpetuating past discriminatory employment practices, the court held that the system was unlawful under Title
VII. 55 It was further reasoned that a seniority system which

'' 6
"carr[ied] forward the effects of former discriminatory practices"
could only be justified if it was "essential to the safe and efficient

operation of [the company].

' 57

Once it had determined that the

system could not be justified as essential to the business operations
of the company, 58 the court found it necessary to modify the
seniority system. To effect this, the remedy utilized in Quarles was
adopted5 9 and the departmental seniority system was supplanted
with plant-wide seniority.6 0 Citing the Quarles court's interpretation
seniority, so that the person who had worked the longest in the progression line below
received the job. 416 F.2d at 983. After passage of the Act, the company merged the
progression lines within each department. However, all jobs performed by black employees
were ranked beneath the jobs performed by whites in the same department. Permanently
ranked behind new white employees, blacks with years of service were unable to attain
sufficient seniority to be eligible for the higher paying jobs. Id. at 984.
5 ld. at 983.
56

Id.

" Id. at 989. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court
held that a discriminatory employment practice would be violative of Title VII unless it
could be shown that the practice constituted a "business necessity." Id. at 431. In that case, it
was found that the employer's practice of requiring a high school diploma and sufficient
scores on intelligence tests as part of the hiring process could not be justified as a "business
necessity." Id.
Generally, courts have interpreted the "business necessity" requirement of Griggs as
permitting an employment practice that has a disparate impact on blacks only if such practice
is essential to the safe and efficient operation of a valid business purpose. See, e.g., United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970). In each of these cases, the court found that a departmental seniority system which perpetuated the effect of prior discriminatory employment practices could not be justified according to the business necessity test. 479 F.2d at 366;
446 F.2d at 662; 444 F.2d at 799-800; 431 F.2d at 249.
For a thorough examination of the concept of business necessity see Note, supra note 31.
ss 416 F.2d at 989.
s' 279 F. Supp. at 521.
60 416 F.2d at 988. This remedy, called the "rightful place" approach, permits the black
employee to compete for employment preferences on the basis of his company or plantwide seniority rather than by length of service in his previous department or job. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1158.
Two other approaches 'that have been used to resolve the problems presented by
discriminatory seniority systems are the " 'freedom now' " approach and the " 'status quo'"
approach. The "'freedom now'" approach permits blacks to replace white incumbents who
have jobs, which "but for" prior discriminatory policies, blacks would have had. The " 'status
quo' " approach provides that where the seniority system is facially neutral, it should not be
altered in any way. Id.
A majority of courts have adopted the rationale of the" 'rightful place' approach" because
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of the legislative history of Title VII, 6 1 the court noted that it was the
intent of Congress to protect plant-wide seniority systems as "bona
62
fide" within the meaning of the Act.
Consistent with the decisions in Quarles and United Papermakers,
courts have generally held that employment preferences, based
upon seniority in jobs or departments from which blacks have been
previously excluded because of race, are discriminatory in violation
of Title VII. 6 3 However, courts have differed on the question of
whether layoffs based upon plant-wide seniority are discriminatory when newly hired members of protected groups are the first to
be fired under the last-in, first-out priority of most seniority
4
schemes.

6

That was the very question confronting the court in Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of InternationalHarvester Co. 65 Although blacks
it is viewed as preventing the perpetuation "of past discrimination without granting preferential
treatment to any racial group." BNA EMP. PRACTICES MAN. 421:551,552(1975). See, e.g., Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398,422-23(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc.,
479 F.2d 354,374-75 & n.17 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
In contrast to the evaluation of most courts that the rightful place approach measures
an employee's seniority from the date the worker entered the company, some courts have
interpreted the rightful place approach as being a remedy by which only some seniority that
an employeehas acquired in his old job, is transferred to the new job. BNA EMP. PRACTICES
MAN. 421:551, 556-57 (1975). See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1158. Compare
Thornton v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 419-20 (6th Cir. 1974) with Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 451 (5th Cir. 1973). Although both courts found that
the rightful place approach was the proper remedy, they differed as to how much seniority
could be transferred to the new job. In Bing, the court indicated that black employees'
seniority should be computed from the time they became qualified to transfer. 485 F.2d at
451. In Thornton, the court rejected that approach, maintaining that it would result in the
preferential treatment of blacks. 497 F.2d at 420-21. Thus, the Thornton court concluded
that seniority should date from the time the black employees first applied for a transfer to
the new job or from the time the worker first filed the complaint against the employer. Id. at
420.
:1 416 F.2d at 987-88.
62 'he court stated:
We conclude, in agreement with Quarles, that Congress exempted from the antidiscrimination requirements only those seniority rights that gave white workers
preference over junior Negroes.
Id. at 995.
" See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 453 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 323 (E.D. La. 1970); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 319 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Va. 1970).
4 Compare Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1320
(7th Cir. 1974) with Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local 2369, 369 F. Supp.
1221, 1228 (E.D. La. 1974).
65 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
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had been seeking employment at the company since 1947, it was
not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that the
company hired a black worker.6 6 As a result, black employees were
unable to acquire sufficient seniority to survive layoffs. 67 Waters,
a black employee, claimed that the seniority system at the plant was
unlawful under Title VII because it perpetuated the effects of the
68
company's previous discriminatory policy.
Agreeing with the evaluation of the legislative history in
Quarles and United Papermakers, the Waters court found that Congress intended to protect plant-wide seniority as a bona fide system
within the meaning of Title VII. 69 The court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that the seniority system should be altered because it perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. 70 Distinguishing the
prior cases in which courts had modified seniority systems, it
was emphasized that those situations involved challenges with
respect to departmental seniority. 7' In contrast to a system based
upon departmental seniority, a plant-wide seniority system did "not
of itself" perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 7 2 The court
stated that
through a department or job seniority policy... blacks would be
given no credit for their previous years of employment with the
employer and would be placed at the bottom of the employee
roster

. .

.7

Under plant-wide seniority, however, it was noted that workers
were given "equal credit for actual length of service with the
employer. ' 74 Additionally, it was pointed out that in modifying
departmental seniority systems, courts frequently employed
plant-wide seniority "as a racially neutral and adequate remedy to
the discriminatory impact of the prior seniority systems. 7 5
66 Id. at 1316.
67 See id. at 1318.
68

Id. at 1317.

19 Id. at 1318-20.
70 Id.

at 1318.
71 Id. at 1317-18.
72 Id. at 1318. The court implied that a bona fide seniority system cannot in fact

perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. Id.
73 Id.

74 Id. at 1317-18.
71 Id. at 1318. In addition to Waters' challenging the seniority system at the plant,
Waters and Samuels, a new black applicant at the plant, claimed that "two amendatory
agreements to the collective bargaining contract" between the company and the union were
discriminatory and in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1312-13, 1320.
Prior to 1965, the company did not have a provision for severance pay in the collective
bargaining contract. After the company realized that it would be necessary to lay off eight
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Facts very similar to those in Waters were contrastingly
evaluated by a district court in Watkins v. United Steel Workers of
America, Local 2369.76 Due to the company's prior discriminatory
hiring policy, 7 7 black workers hired after the passage of Title VII
were unable to acquire sufficient seniority to withstand layoffs
initiated in 1971.78 Since recall rights were also based upon length
of service with the79company, it was unlikely that a black worker
would be recalled.
The court held that the company's use of plant-wide seniority
as the basis for deciding which workers should be laid off was
racially discriminatory in violation of Title VII. s0 This holding was
based upon the decisions in the departmental seniority cases"' and
the referral system cases.8 2 According to the court's analysis, these
two groups of decisions established the principle that
white workers with five to six years seniority, in addition to other junior black workers, the
company and the union negotiated an amendatory agreement directed exclusively to the
eight white employees. Id. at 1313. The agreement provided that the eight workers had
the option of either retaining their contract seniority rights or receiving $966.00 in severance pay. Id. The workers chose to give up their contract seniority rights in favor of
receiving severance pay. Id. at 1314. Since company policy granted workers with the most
seniority priority for the purposes of recall, the eight workers, in effect, chose to forfeit their
right to recall. Id. at 1313-14.
When the company realized that it had underestimated its need for workers, employees
were recalled in the order of their seniority. However, as a result of the recall situation at the
plant, the company negotiated a second amendatory agreement with the union. This agreement was made for the purpose of recalling the workers who had previously exchanged their
seniority rights, and therefore their right to recall, in favor of receiving severance pay. At the
trial Waters and Samuels claimed that the second amendatory agreement was discriminatory
because it had the effect of advancing the three white workers who had elected to return to the
plant ahead of them on the hiring and recall list. Id. at 1314.
The court found that the company's action toward Waters, with respect to the granting
of priority to white workers who had previously forfeited their contract seniority rights in
favor of severance pay, was discriminatory because it "project[ed] the company into the
realm of presently perpetuating the racial discrimination of the past." Id.- at 1320-21.
Rejecting the company's contention that the amendatory agreement was justified as a "business necessity," the court emphasized-that "an employment practice 'can be justified only by
a showing that it is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business.' "Id. at 1321
(quoting from Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971)). The court further noted that the company's goodwill and concern for possible
labor problems did not meet the requisites for a showing of business necessity. 502 F.2d at

1321.
For a discussion of the business necessity test see note 57 supra.
71 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974).
77 Except for two black workers who had been hired in the
1940's, until 1965 only
whites were employed at the plant. Id. at 1223.
78

Id. at 1224.

79 Id.

s0 Id. at 1228.
"' Id. at 1225. See note 63 supra.
82 369 F. Supp. at 1226. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
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employment preferences cannot be allocated on the basis of
length of service or seniority, where blacks were, by virtue of
prior discrimination,
prevented from accumulating relevant
83
seniority.
Finding that blacks at the company were prevented from acquiring
such seniority due to prior hiring practices, the court asserted that
the plant-wide seniority system perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination and was therefore not a bona fide system within the
s4
meaning of Title VII.
The court acknowledged the fact that plant-wide seniority was
considered to be a racially neutral system in the departmental
seniority cases, but maintained that this was not because such a
system was "per se valid. '8 5 In analyzing the departmental seniority
cases, it noted that because blacks had been excluded only
from certain jobs, they had acquired sufficient years of service with
the company to enable them to compete equally with the white
workers for plant-wide seniority.8 6 However, those situations were
viewed as being easily distinguishable from Watkins, in which blacks
had been previously excluded from the plant itself and were thus
prevented from earning sufficient plant-wide seniority to withstand
layoffs.8 7
Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.
Ohio 1970), vacated on other grounds, 438 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1971); Dobbins v. Local 212,
IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
The Watkins court noted that the cases concerning referral rules most frequently
involved contractors in the construction trades who were required by the collective bargaining contract to hire craftsmen referred by the union. Under this procedure blacks were
systematically excluded from craft work under the collective bargaining contract. 369 F.
Supp. at 1226.
Although blacks were subsequently admitted into the unions, the referral rules were
maintained. Because the referral rules gave a job preference to workers with the longest
service, blacks were placed in the lowest group for the purposes of referral. Id.
The Watkins court stressed that in all of these cases, the referral systems were found to
be violative of Title VII because "they perpetuated the effect of past discrimination against
blacks, and presently deprived blacks of equal employment opportunity." Id.
81 369 F. Supp. at 1226.
84 Id. at 1228.
85 Id. at 1226 (emphasis in original).
86 Id.
87 Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the evaluation of section 703(h) of Title VII,
as expressed by the court in Quarles, supported a finding that a plant-wide seniority system
could be violative of Title VII. Id. at 1228. Citing Judge Butzner's analysis of section 703(h)
in Quarles, it was emphasized that
"Section 703(h) expressly states the seniority system must be bonafide. The purpose
of the act is to eliminate racial discrimination in covered employment. Obviously
one characteristic of a bona fide seniority system must be lack of discrimination."
Id. (quoting from Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968))
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Finally, the court rejected the defendant's contention that
modification of a plant-wide seniority system was not a valid remedy because it would not help the victims of the original discrimination who had not been hired because of the company's
previous discriminatory practices.8 8 It was recognized that in
Title VII cases, frequent use has been made of remedies benefiting
individuals other than those who were originally discriminated
against, in order to prevent the perpetuating effects of prior discrimination.8 9
In essence, the courts in Waters and Watkins differed in their
interpretations of what would qualify as a bona fide seniority system. 9.0 The court in Waters found that plant-wide seniority was a
bona fide system because it was neutral on its face and "of itself"
did not perpetuate past discrimination. 9 1 In Watkins, however, it
was asserted that a facially neutral plant-wide seniority system
could not be a bona fide seniority system if it continued the effects
of past discriminatory practices. 92
Against this background, Jersey Central represents a significant
step toward insulating from attack systems based upon plant-wide
seniority that have a disproportionate effect upon women and
members of minority groups. 93 Consistent with the interpretation
of the legislative history in Quarles and United Papermakers, the
court in Jersey Central found that Congress intended a facially
neutral plant-wide seniority system to be bona fide even though it
operated to the disadvantage of protected groups. 9 4 To support
this evaluation of the legislative history of Title VII, the court
relied primarily upon the interpretive memoranda introduced into
the record by Senator Clark during debate in the House. 9 5 Thus,
it rejected the conclusion reached in Watkins that the interpretive memoranda were not a valid basis for evaluating the
legislative intent underlying Title VII because the statements were
made prior to its adoption. 9 6 Emphasizing that "the legislative
(emphasis in original). Therefore, the court in Watkins asserted that because the employer
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, the system did not have the essential characteristics of a bona fide seniority system-namely, lack of discrimination. 369 F. Supp. at
1228.
88 369 F. Supp. at 1231.
89 Id.

'0 See 508 F.2d at 705 n.48.
.9 502 F.2d at 1318.
92 369 F. Supp. at 1228.
9 88 LAB. REL. REP. 21, 24 (1975).

94 508 F.2d at 710.
9' Id. at 707-08 & n.56.
96 Id.

at 707 n.56.
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history of Title VII [was] largely uninstructive with respect to
seniority rights '9 7 and finding that the congressional statements
dealt directly with seniority systems, the court maintained that the
memoranda were useful as a primary source in evaluating the
legislative intent. 98
Acknowledging the potential hardship to some individuals,9 9
the court stressed that to modify the seniority provisions of the
collective bargaining contract, so that women and members of
minority groups would not be adversely affected, would necessitate
the creation of "fictional seniority.' "100 It was maintained that such
an approach would involve " 'preferentialrather than remedial treatment'" in violation of section 703(j) of Title VII. t t Thus, the court
reasoned that
Congress, while recognizing that a bona fide seniority system
might well perpetuate past discriminatory practices, nevertheless
chose between upsetting all collective bargaining agreements
with such provisions and permitting them despite the perpetuating effect that they might have. 102
Because it had determined that Congress intended to protect
plant-wide seniority, the court found that it would be improper to
modify such systems on the basis of public policy.' 0 3 It emphasized
that with "Title VII, Congress ...supplanted with its own views any
judicial determination of public policy.' 0 4 Furthermore, it was asserted that any remedy which "alleviat[ed] the effects of past discrimination" would have to come from the Congress, "and not by judicial
05
decree."'
Even more basic to the court's decision than the public policy
issue was its definition of a bona fide seniority system: "[A] bona
91 Id. at 705.
"8 Id. at 707.
99 See id.at 710.
100 Id. at 709 (quoting from Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis by the court).
101508 F.2d at 709 (quoting from Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis by the court).
Section 7030) provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group...
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number ...of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
102
103

508 F.2d at 706.
Id. at 704-05, 710.

104 Id. at 704-05 (footnote omitted).
105 Id. at 710.
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fide plant-wide seniority system is one which is facially neutral and
was neither designed nor intended to disguise discriminatory practices. ' 10 6 Therefore, in contrast to the majority of cases,107 the court
maintained that an aggrieved party would be required to submit
evidence showing a subjective intent to discriminate in order to
successfully challenge a facially neutral plant-wide seniority system. l0 8 Evidence of nothing more than the fact that a system
perpetuated the discrimination of the past was found to be "without probative value in challenging a bona fide seniority system."1 9
Analyzing the proper procedure for introducing evidence in
the proceeding to uncover such an intent to discriminate, the
court found that the district court should have viewed the evidence
in two stages. Initially, only "evidence directed either to the
neutrality of the seniority system or evidence directed to ascertaining an intent or design to disguise discrimination" would be permitted. 1 10 If after considering such evidence, the court concluded
that the seniority system was bona fide, no further evidence would
be allowed. However, where evidence supported a finding that the
seniority system was not bona fide, a second evidentiary stage
would be made available to the complainant so that he might
introduce "all evidence relevant to a Title VII proceeding, including but not limited to past discriminatory employment practices.""'
Id. at 706-07 n.54.
107 Many courts have maintained that proof of a subjective intent to discriminate is not
106

required to show that an employment practice is discriminatory under Title VII. TITLE VII
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 40. Section 703(h) protects different terms and conditions of
employment which are applied "pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ...provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1970).
In United Papermakers the court considered section 703(g) of Title VII and determined
that "the statute, read literally, requires only that the defendant meant to do what he did,
that is, his employment practice was not accidental." 416 F.2d at 996. Consequently, the
court rejected the defendant's contention that the seniority system was protected by the
statute because the system was not maintained with the intent to discriminate. Id. at 996-97. It
concluded that "[t]he requisite intent may be inferred from the fact that the defendants
persisted in the conduct after its racial implications had become known to them." Id. at 997.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. United States Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
indicated that a subjective intent to discriminate was not required, noting that "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). See also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d
348,355 (5th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791,796 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971).
508 .2d-at 7-06.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 706-07 & n.54 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 706-07 n.54. It has been suggested that because most of the pertinent informaI
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Van Dusen disagreed with
the court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Act and
the public policy behind Title VII. 1 2 He found persuasive the view
expressed in Watkins that Congress did not intend a facially neutral
plant-wide seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination to be a bona fide system which would be immune to
judicial modification."13 Drawing an analogy to the departmental
seniority cases, he emphasized that plant-wide systems having the
14
same effect should also be subject to modification.'
Furthermore, Judge Van Dusen rejected the majority's view
that Title VII alone provided the formulation of public policy with
respect to seniority, noting that
the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights
under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to
supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions
relating to employment discrimination. 115
By implication, the court in Jersey Central indicated that there
exist two means of obtaining modification of a facially neutral
plant-wide seniority system that perpetuates the effects of past
discrimination. First, the court observed that through the express
terms in a conciliation agreement, the parties could modify the
seniority provisions of the collective bargaining contract. 1 6 However, it is unlikely that any union would agree to such a modification relevant to a Title VII proceeding "is in the hands of the defendants," the complainant
rarely has an opportunity to collect that which would be necessary to show discrimination.
TITLE VII MANUAL, supra note 3, at 32. As a result, the courts have permitted "a very liberal
approach to allowing proof of discrimination" through pre-trial discovery. Id. at 35.
The sources of information permitted in such a proceeding have included civil rights
organizations' case histories on employers suspected of discrimination and governmental
agencies' statistical data indicating that an employment practice is discriminatory. Id. at
32-33.
112 508 F.2d at 710.
"1
Id. at 712. At least one study has indicated that the interpretive memoranda, so
heavily relied upon by a number of courts as the primary tool in evaluating the legislative
intent underlying Title V1I, may represent an inaccurate evaluation of the statute with
respect to the issue of seniority. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1611. They emphasized
that none of the congressional statements introduced by Senator Clark were ever presented
on the floor of the Senate, and that there was no debate of their contents or discussion of the
issue of seniority. Id. at 1610. Furthermore, the writers stressed that the congressional
statements were made prior to the addition of section 703(h) to Title VII, and could not
therefore have been interpretive of that provision. Id. at 1613.
114 508 F.2d at 711.
115 Id.

'16 See, id. at 701.
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tion. This was precisely the case in Jersey Central." 7 Unions have
resisted modification of established seniority systems because
nearly all of the benefits negotiated in the collective bargaining
contract during the last two decades have been predicated upon a
worker's seniority status.'"" Additionally, workers have valued their
seniority rights so highly because, as a standard for determining
the allocation of work, they offer a large degree of objectivity
which protects the worker from the "personal preferences" of.the
employer.1 19
Second, the court. implied that a facially neutral plant-wide
seniority system could be modified if the aggrieved party could
show a subjective intent to discriminate.12 0 However, because of the
difficulty in proving such a subjective intent, the effect of the
court's decision is to almost completely "insulat[e] plant-wide
12
seniority systems from attack."1 '
Although the court did consider circumstances under which a
plant-wide seniority system could be modified, conspicuously absent
from the court's analysis was any discusssion of remedial measures
that would be available if it could be shown that a system was
maintained with the intent to discriminate. Presented with a questionable legislative history that was "largely uninstructive with respectto seniority,"'' 2 2 the court was left with no alternative but to
phrase the issues before it narrowly. Consequently, the court indicated that without any legislative direction as to affirmative relief
that would be appropriate, 123 it would be necessary to uphold the
24
seniority rights of the incumbent white workers.1
Further compounding the problem, however, is the strong
25
possibility that Congress will not provide prescriptive legislation.1
The major reason for this apparent inaction is that any potential
solution which has been proposed thus far would inevitably work a
26
detrimental effect upon a substantial segment of the labor force.1
117 Id. at 695-96 n.20.
118 See SLICHTER, supra note 7, at 104-05.
It9 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1602-04. See SLICHTER, supra note 7, at 104-05.

110 See 508 F.2d at 706-07 & n.54.
1 88 LAB. REL. REP. 21, 24 (1975).
122 508 F.2d at 705.
123 Id. at 710.
124 Id. at 691.
125 According to one undisclosed source, the possibility of Congress' passing prescriptive legislation was remote: " 'Legislation? Are you crazy? We're not kamikazes over here.'"
N.Y..Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 5.
126 Work-sharing programs have been suggested as an alternative to layoffs whereby
work would be allocated throughout the company on a more limited scale so that each
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Therefore, in the absence of further guidance from the legislature,
and in light of the questionable legislative history, courts will continue to be presented with the dilemma of balancing the need for
relief for women and members of minority groups' 2 7 with the
potential harm to the seniority rights and job security of the incumbent white workers.
Katherine J. Fell
employee would work shorter hours. See SLICHTER, supra note 7, at 142. However, within the
past few years there has been strong resistance on the part of unions to adopting such a
procedure. In addition to the union's objection to" 'sharing [the] misery,' "the principal reason
for labor's position has been the fact that unemployment compensation benefits have increased
to such a degree that a shortened work week would not provide any more compensation to the
worker than that which would be received under state unemployment programs and the
collective bargaining contracts. Id. at 152-53.
Another remedy that has been suggested is implementation of a system whereby layoffs
could be accomplished according to the employee's seniority and ability. Id. at 155. However,
such a procedure would probably be opposed by the unions because an evaluation of an
employee's ability might subject the worker to the "personal preferences" of the employer.
See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1603-04.
A plan also under consideration would involve the use of a short-term inverse seniority
system whereby an employee who has attained a year's seniority could receive up to a full
year's pay through a combination of state unemployment insurance and supplemental layoff benefits. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 4, col. 5. However, in a period of recession,
where the likelihood is that many individuals laid off will remain out of work, the value of
these types of compensation is questionable. See id., Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
Finally, separate seniority lists have been suggested as a remedy whereby different
records would be devised for minorities, women, and white male workers. However, a
question has been raised with regard to where black and white female employees would be
listed. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, Civil No. 74-1083, at 18 (D.N.J.,
Sept. 5, 1974) (oral opinion). Furthermore, this procedure, which was used extensively
twenty years ago, was rejected by the unions precisely because it was usually implemented
with the result of "restrict[ing] the competitive status" of these groups. SLICHTER, supra note 7,
at 135. Although this procedure has been omitted from most collective bargaining contracts,
there is some indication that separate seniority lists are still in use in particular industries. Id.
127 For a discussion of the unemployment statistics with respect to women and members
of minority groups see N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 4.

